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Living "Top-Down" in a "Bottom-Up"
World: Musings on the Relationship
Between Jewish Ethics' and
Legal Ethics
This essay comes from an invitation to present the 1998 Louis
Nemzer Memorial Lecture at The Ohio State University. That invita-
© Copyright held by the NEBRAsKA LAW REVIEW.
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. Thanks to
Art Greenbaum, Dan Keating, Brian Lepard, Ted Janger, Ronald Mann, Kathy
Northern, Steve Resnicoff, Allan Samansky, and Jeff Van Niel for reading an
early draft of this essay. I owe special thanks to Rabbi Gary Huber of Congrega-
tion Beth Tikvah and Kim Clarke for their invaluable help in researching this
area and to Ohio State's Hillel for inviting me to present this lecture as the 1998
Louis Nemzer Memorial Lecture. I owe immeasurable thanks to my parents for
instilling in me a love of things Jewish and to my husband for being my best
sounding board on this essay.
1. Actually, my discussion of Jewish ethics really refers to following Jewish law
regarding conduct. By limiting my discussion to Jewish ethics, I don't mean to
slight the ethics of any other religion. For some wonderful discussions related to
ethical issues in other religions, see Veryl Victoria Miles, Assessing Modern
Bankruptcy Law: An Example of Justice, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1025 (1996)
(measuring the justice of the Bankruptcy Code by reference to Catholic
principles) and Thomas L. Shaffer, On Religious Legal Ethics, 35 CATH. LAW. 393
(1994). For a wonderful discussion of the many dimensions of law and religion,
see Fordham's recent symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work:
An Interfaith Conference, 66 FoRDHAm L. REV. 1075 (1998).
Russell Pearce pointed out an interesting phenomenon.
Last Spring.... I had the opportunity to help lead a[ ] ... program for
Jewish and Christian lawyers on the role of religion in a lawyer's work.
At the first session, the lawyers received text sources and heard talks
from a leading Christian theologian and a prominent Rabbi on religious
perspectives on professional role. I then separated the lawyers into a
Christian group and a Jewish group and asked them to construct a
religious concept of the lawyer's professional role. The Christian lawyers
debated whether the concepts of vocation and calling applied to their
work. Despite explicit guidance from the Rabbinic speaker, the Jewish
lawyers ignored the religious implications of their practice. Instead,
they focused on how their minority status and the resulting experience
of discrimination influenced their approach to lawyering, including their
commitment to rule of law and social justice.
Russell G. Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer's Question, 27 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1259,
1260 (1996).
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tion gave me the opportunity to write about the intersection of Jewish
ethics and legal ethics. It's not surprising that I chose that topic,
given my background.
I've been fascinated by legal ethics ever since I was a first-year as-
sociate at my former law firm. Even then, I was trying to understand
how the generalist ethics rules-"be zealous in representing your cli-
ent";2 "protect the client's confidential information";3 "be loyal to the
interests of your cient"4-fit particular types of legal situations. Once
I beca'me an academic, I was able to spend much more time thinking
about some difficult ethical questions. Virtually all of my research
has, in some way, been tied to legal ethics, especially bankruptcy
ethics.5
2. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.1 cmt. 1 (1993) [herein-
after MODEL RULES] ("The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the ful-
lest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure.");
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsrBILITY DR 7-102 (1983) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]. Model Rules 3.2-3.9 spend a lot of time describing what is not
considered appropriate zeal. See MODEL RULES, supra, Rules 3.2-3.9.
3. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6 (general rule regarding confidenti-
ality), Rule 1.2 cmt. 7 ("lawyer is not permitted to reveal the client's wrongdoing,
except where permitted by Rule 1.6"), Rule 1.17 cmt. 11 (lawyer selling her law
practice must protect dissemination of confidential information); MODEL CODE,
supra note 2, DR 4-101 (general rule regarding confidentiality).
4. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7 (general conflict of interest rule),
Rule 1.7 cmt. 1 ("Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a
client."), Rule 1.8 (conflicts relating to prohibited transactions), Rule 1.9 (conflicts
relating to former clients), Rule 1.10 (imputed disqualification); MODEL CODE,
supra note 2, DR 5-101 (general conflict of interest rule).
5. See, e.g., John D. Ayer et al. Ethics: Is Disinterestedness Still a Viable Concept?
A Roundtable Discussion, 5 Ari. BANuI. INsT. L. REv. 201 (1997); C.R. Bowles, Jr.
& Nancy B. Rapoport, Has the DIP's Attorney Become the Ultimate Creditors'
Lawyer in Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases?, 5 Ai. BANx. INST. L. REv. 47
(1997); Nancy B. Rapoport, Avoiding Judicial Wrath: The Ten Commandments
for Bankruptcy Practitioners, 5 J. BAmxR. L. & PRAc. 615 (September/October
1996); Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code
of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 A1. BsAcR. INsT. L. REv. 45 (1998) [hereinafter Rapo-
port, Uniform Code]; Nancy B. Rapoport, Seeing the Forest and The Trees: The
Proper Role of the Bankruptcy Attorney, 70 IND. L.J. 783 (1995); Nancy B. Rapo-
port, Turning and Turning in the Widening Gyre: The Problem of Potential Con-
flicts of Interest in Bankruptcy, 26 CONN. L. REV. 913 (1994); Nancy B. Rapoport,
Turning the Microscope on Ourselves: Self-Assessment by Bankruptcy Lawyers of
Potential Conflicts of Interest in Columbus, Ohio, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1421 (1997). I
am, of course, not alone in writing about bankruptcy ethics. See, e.g., John D.
Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 A. BANER. L.J. 355 (1986); The
Hon. William Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemption
Limitations: The "Opt-Out" as Child of the First and Parent of the Second, 71 A1.
BANca. L.J. 149 (1997); The Hon. A. Jay Cristol et al., Exemption Planning: How
Far May You Go?, 48 S.C. L. REV. 715 (1997); Bradley M. Elbein, Esq., An Ob-
scure Revolution: The Liability of Professionals in Bankruptcy, 48 S.C. L. REv.
743 (1997); Karen Gross & Jeanne M. Weisneck, Selected Bibliography on Ethics
for Bankruptcy Professionals, 68 Am. BANxR. L.J. 419 (1994); Regina Stango
Kelbon et al., Conflicts, the Appointment of'Professionals," and Fiduciary Duties
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In the Nemzer lecture, I ventured outside my comfort zone of bank-
ruptcy ethics into the zone of Jewish ethics. That was a bit scary for
someone who grew up as one of a handful of Jews in a small town in
Texas. Our house was chock-full of Jewish knowledge-everything
from the Encyclopedia Judaica to books and articles written by my
own family-and still, with such a small Jewish population, my Jew-
ish upbringing was vastly different from Jews growing up in areas like
New York or Los Angeles. I was, and am, Jewish-identified and some-
what (erratically) observant, but I'm not someone who was immersed
in orthodox culture growing up. In this essay, then, I have the oppor-
tunity to unite my two worlds: my Jewish world and my academic
world.
Let's start with two different ways of looking at ethics. One way is
what I call the "top down" view. The rules of behavior are given to the
society by the leader (the governing authority) of that society. Jewish
ethics are, by their nature, "top down" rules. We get them from God
(although, in a few pages, I'll discuss some vastly different conceptions
of Jewish ethics). Although the meaning of various Jewish ethical
rules can be-and are-debated hotly, the legitimacy of these rules
comes from a single authority,6 rather than from a consensus of
opinion.
Contrast that with the way that legal rules of ethics are developed
in the United States. There's no one single source that issues ethics
edicts in law in the same top-down manner of Jewish ethics.7 Instead,
lawyers debate what rules should be adopted to describe the common
ground of ethical behavior. After they reach a consensus, they draft
the rules.8 I'd call this more of a "bottom-up" approach: the commu-
nity as a whole agrees on the rules and then enforces them.9
of Major Parties in Chapter 11, 8 BAica. DEV. J. 349 (1991); Miles, supra note 1;
Mary Josephine Newborn, The New Rawlsian Theory of Bankruptcy Ethics, 16
CARDozo L. REv. 111 (1994); Gerald M. Smith, Conflicts of Interest in Workouts
and Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 48 S.C. L. REv. 793 (1997); Mary Jo New-
born Wiggins, A Statute of Disbelief?: Clashing Ethical Imperatives in Fraudulent
Transfer Law, 48 S.C. L. REv. 771 (1997). No matter how many times I hear the
joke, I still refuse to believe that bankruptcy ethics is an oxymoron.
6. To the extent that some Jewish laws are derived from interpreting certain Jewish
principles, some of these laws are "human-reasoned" and not directly "God-
derived."
7. I'd hazard a guess that, in civil-law countries, the formation of legal ethics rules
would be more of a "top-down" approach than a "bottom-up" approach.
8. As Monroe Freedman explains, "Legal ethics differs from ethics generally: Ethics
is thinking about morals. Legal ethics is thinking about the morals of someone
else." Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics From a Jewish Perspective, 27 TEx.
TECH L. REV. 1131, 1132 (1996).
9. Well, technically, a state supreme court will adopt the rules, often based on the
Model Rules or the Model Code, and enforce them. Typically, though, a court will
seek input from lawyers before adopting the rules. Reasonable minds can disa-
[Vol. 78:18
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We can draw several conclusions from the way that the top-down
and bottom-up approaches differ. One obvious conclusion is that the
top-down approach spends more time emphasizing aspirational goals.
It's not good enough merely to "not be" a "bad" Jew; we must con-
stantly strive to be "better" Jews. The bottom-up approach, on the
other hand, has aspirational aspects, which suggest how to be a "good"
lawyer. Still, the bottom-up approach-because it is developed by
compromise and consensus-focuses much of its efforts on prohibiting
"bad" behavior. If a lawyer doesn't commit an ethical violation, she
can't be punished-even if her behavior doesn't live up to the aspira-
tional goals of the ethics rules.1O
Another distinction is the "absolute rightness" of the rules. In a
top-down world, the "rightness" of the rules is a "given." Much like a
parent's phrase, "because I said so," the rules simply "are" and, as
such, are "right" by definition. In a bottom-up world, on the other
hand, the rules are created through debate and compromise, and the
result can be "mostly right" but not necessarily "absolutely right."1i
The "rightness" isn't right by definition but is due to an overlap be-
tween what the community decides is right and our notions of moral
"rightness."
That's my first distinction: the top-down approach vs. the bottom-
up approach. But before we can really examine the differences and
similarities of Jewish ethics and legal ethics, we need to make a few
more distinctions. I base the next set of distinctions on what would
make someone decide to follow any ethics rules. What gives ethics
rules their power is the willingness of the "governed" group to be gov-
erned by those particular rules. That, in turn, means that people have
to decide just which group they're in.
It's a fallacy to say that anyone is a member of just one group. 12
Typically, people are members of several groups simultaneously: for
example, I'm a married, female, Ashkenazic, Reform Jewish law pro-
fessor living in Lincoln, Nebraska. Depending on what context I'm in,
any one of these (or any other of my myriad of group identities) may
gree as to how much input the legal community gives the court before the court
adopts the rules.
10. I don't mean to say that lawyers shouldn't aspire to "good lawyer" behavior-just
that they can't be punished for not living up to the "best" behavior.
11. Note that Monroe Freedman finds "Jewish sources" for themes in legal ethics,
including "the dignity and sanctity of the individual, compassion for fellow
human beings, individual autonomy, and equal protection of the laws." Freed-
man, supra note 8, at 1134. Still, the very non-uniformity of state ethics codes
demonstrates the murky nature of compromise and consensus inherent in a bot-
tom-up approach.
12. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (discussing the overlapping identities of being female
and African-American).
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come to the fore. Each of my identities is important, although some
are more important than others.13
Let's start by examining one area of identity: Jewishness.14
Although we all know that there's an infinite range of ways in which
people can identify as Jewish, I'm just going to talk about the Big
Three and One Other: observant/Orthodox Jews, Conservative Jews,
and Reform Jews, on the one hand, and socially or ethnically identi-
fied (but nonreligious) Jews, on the other.15 One way of viewing Jew-
ishness is by the degree to which the top-down rules are taken
literally by the Big Three and One Other. Another, closely related,
way of viewing Jewishness would be the degree to which all of the
other "memberships" are governed by those same top-down rules.
Take observant/Orthodox Jews: everything in their life is governed
by these top-down rules (work, prayer, food, relationships, etc.). 16
There's a beauty to that way of life-a beauty born of appreciating,
and ritualizing, every aspect of life: from seeing something wonderful
for the first time (which has its own bracha) to eating an ordinary
meal (ditto). Because of the ways in which observant Jews must con-
duct their daily lives, they tend to gather in communities composed of
other observant Jews, if that's at all possible. 17 Their goal is to follow
God's commandments as fully as they possibly can, and all of their
other memberships relate to their "top-down" world.
As we move farther away from the observant side of the observant/
nonobservant continuum, we see less of a willingness to follow all of
13. Cf GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946) ("All ani-
mals are equal. But some animals are more equal than others.").
14. Sandy Levinson has written about five different types of Jewish lawyers. See
Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction
of Professional Identity, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1577 (1993). I'm using his article as
a jumping point for my discussion.
15. There are, of course, also unaffiliated Jews: Jews by birth who don't think, one
way or another, about their Jewishness. Levinson presents "five models of the
Jewish lawyer"- roughly speaking: (1) nonaffiliated Jews who are lawyers; (2)
ethnically identified Jews who are lawyers; (3) Jews who observe some of the
commandments while practicing law; (4) Jews practicing in Jewish court set-
tings; and (5) observant/Orthodox Jews who practice outside of the Jewish court
setting. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 1585-1605. I find his typology intriguing
but ultimately not very useful for my purposes. Cf Russell G. Pearce, Jewish
Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A Midrash on Levinson, 14 CARDozo L.
REV. 1613 (1993).
16. See Pearce, supra note 1, at 1266 ("Godly actions have been a necessary part of
being a religious Jew."); Steven H. Resnicoff, A Jewish Look at Lawyering Ethics,
15 TouRo L. REV. 73, 77 (1998) ("Indeed, the nature of Jewish law is that it is a
24-hour a day, 7-day a week religion with prescribed rules for virtually every
activity.").
17. It certainly makes their lives easier that way. They have better access to kosher
food, to a minyan, and to other necessities of observant life.
[Vol. 78:18
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the rules literally.1 8 Now, I'm not saying that Conservative Jews
aren't observant or that their Jewishness doesn't govern their daily
conduct. Far from it.19 But they have elected to modernize the appli-
cation of the commandments, which means that, at the very least,
they're engaging in a different level of interpreting the rules.2 0 And
Reform Jews tend toward even more interpretation, and more selec-
tion, in terms of which rules to follow. 2 1
What of nonreligious but still Jewishly identified Jews? Their
group membership doesn't seem to come from a top-down basis but
from other, still strong, ties. I'm finding it difficult to fit them into my
typology, but we need to note their presence. In order to round out the
continuum, I also have to consider a fifth group: Jews who don't iden-
tify with Judaism at all. It would be convenient if I could draw a con-
tinuum of Jewish identity, with observant/Orthodox Jews on one side
and unaffiliated Jews on the other side. I'm not sure that it's that
simple, but we'll use the continuum construct for now.
Now let's look at the bottom-up system of legal ethics. The two
most common models of ethics rules, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, presume
a level of generality about lawyer behavior that is extremely ab-
stract.2 2 Under the Model Code or the Model Rules, the rules are
designed to cover all lawyers. Even though the ethics rules recognize
that lawyers can play several different types of roles-advocate, coun-
selor, mediator-and even though certain rules take those different
roles into account,2 3 the rules are still designed to be multipurpose in
18. Yes, this is a gross generalization. And a lot depends on whether ritualism is
being used for its own sake or as a way of connecting with the world. See Pearce,
supra note 1, at 1265 ("The modern versions of Judaism which emphasize 'pure
ritualism' or other forms which reject the command 'to go out into the world' per-
mit the Jewish lawyer to subscribe to the [idea of professional ethics trumping
individual ethics] or some limited religiosity compatible with [that concept].").
19. See Pearce, supra note 1, at 1266-67 (describing how Reform, Conservative, and
Orthodox Jews all embrace Judaism as a way of life, inseparable from life itself).
20. Observant Jews interpret the rules, too (that's half the fun of religious scholar-
ship), but their goal in interpretation isn't necessarily to modernize the rules.
21. Heck, I began writing this essay on Shabbat, using a computer. rm pretty far on
the non-observant side of the continuum for that, even though I try not to eat
traife food (mostly because I want to make a symbolic statement about being Jew-
ish). Recently, though, Reform Judaism has become more willing to embrace
some traditions, at least for those Reform Jews who feel a need to embrace such
traditions. See Nadine Brozan & Gustav Niebuhr, Reform Judaism Reforms Its
Tenets: New Platform Encourages Old Rituals, CHI. TiuB., May 27, 1999 at 6,
available in 1999 WL 2877387.
22. One of my Ohio State colleagues, Mary Beth Beazley, taught me about how she
uses the "abstraction ladder." I love that ladder image. The level of abstraction
of the ethics codes is somewhere near the top rung of the ladder.
23. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs, supra note 2, Article 2 (rules governing the lawyer in her
role as a counselor), Article 3 (rules governing the lawyer in her role as an advo-
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nature. Other codes of legal ethics are more subject-matter specific:
there are rules for groups such as matrimonial lawyers and military
lawyers, and I'm in the process of proposing (in another article) a set
of rules for bankruptcy lawyers. 24
One thing to note about the codes of legal ethics is that they are
designed to do two things: to punish departures from the "floor" of
acceptable, minimally ethical conduct, and to guide lawyers toward
improvements upon that floor. But only one of these purposes carries
with it the threat of punishment: departures from the floor of accepta-
ble conduct. In other words, the bottom-up effect of legal ethics is that
it punishes the worst behavior of the group. The bottom-up nature
doesn't reward improvements upon decent behavior.25
In addition, because these rules are bottom-up, there's a lot more
leeway in "opting in" and "opting out" of the rules if they don't seem to
apply to a particular situation, although lawyers who make the wrong
decision about "opting out" are subject to sanctions for violating those
ethics rules. For example, there are lawyers who don't "do" litigation,
and those lawyers probably don't spend a lot of time thinking about
the litigation-oriented rules in the ethics codes. Litigators, likewise,
are not likely to be as concerned with things that transactional law-
yers care about, like scriveners' errors (mistakes in drafting a docu-
ment).26 If a bottom-up code is created by consensus, and not from a
unitary authority, then the justification for following the code loses
some of its force if the relevant consensus group wasn't part of the
rule-drafting.
In essence, what I'm saying is that following the Jewish ethics
rules depends in large part on how literally one takes those rules. I
see concentric circles of literalness 2 7 that can predict how closely
those rules are going to be followed. Observant Jews will be the most
likely to follow all of the rules; Conservative Jews will follow most, but
not all, of the rules; and Reform Jews will follow some, but not others.
Obviously, there are some overlaps between top-down and bottom-
up ethics codes. Both top-down and bottom-up codes will frown on,
say, the crime of murder. And yet, if we were to draw a Venn dia-
cate); MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 7-3 (distinguishing the lawyer as advisor
from the lawyer as advocate).
24. See Rapoport, Uniform Code, supra note 5.
25. Although there are awards for "lawyer of the year," not every lawyer who behaves
ethically is going to receive one and not everyone who wins one wins it because of
ethical behavior.
26. For an excellent discussion of the differences between litigation ethics and trans-
actional ethics, see John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 Thx.
L. REv. 457 (1993).
27. Except for my group of ethnically but not religiously identified Jews.
[Vol. 78:18
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gram28 of the two types of rules, there'd be a shaded area where the
two types of codes overlap, but there'd still be a lot in each circle with-
out overlaps.2 9
By now, you should be wondering where I'm taking this discussion.
I've set up two types of codes, each with a different basis for legiti-
macy. What I want to spend the rest of this essay discussing is how a
Jewish lawyer might reconcile Jewish commandments with the com-
mandments of legal ethics.
Let's first clear up a simple but common mistake: we can't refer to
the top-down Jewish code as "the world of the spirit" and the bottom-
up code of lawyers as "the real world."30 The Jewish code has many
"real world" imperatives and the lawyer code has some traditionally
moral precepts. But that still begs the question: how does a top-down
Jewish lawyer behave in the bottom-up world of legal ethics?3 1
That raises several issues facing the Jewish lawyer: issues of Jew-
ish identity (the continuum from religious identity to ethnic identity
to non-identity); and issues of other group affiliations that intersect
with Jewish identity, such as race, gender, politics, and socio-economic
class. There's also the issue of how discrimination has tended to
shape our attitudes toward law and justice.32 As I've already men-
tioned,3 3 each person is an amalgam of several different group identi-
ties. No one's ever just Jewish: there are too many overlapping
affiliations in a person's life. I'm Jewish; I'm a lawyer; I'm a law pro-
fessor; I'm an administrator; I'm female; I'm married; I'm an only child
of two living parents. The list goes on and on.
But even though every person has several overlapping affiliations,
those affiliations must have differences in strength. Try this pop test.
If I asked you to tell me about yourself, what would be the first thing
28. That's the one with the universe of possibilities as a square and each of the do-
mains as circles within the square.
29. Someday, when I have more time, rm looking forward to exploring other areas in
which Judaism and secular law intersect. The intersection of Judaism and busi-
ness ethics (and, naturally, the intersection between Judaism and bankruptcy
law) intrigues me. In the meantime, there are plenty of good articles exploring
these issues. See, e.g., Steven H. Resnicoff, A Jewish Law Perspective on the Pro-
priety ofDischarging Personal Debts, 31 BANRm. CT. DEC. A3 (February 3, 1998);
James Scheinman, The Evolution and Impact of Jewish Law: Jewish Business
Ethics, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 63 (1995).
30. See Pearce, supra note 1, at 1266 ("The separation of work from religion, like the
separation of 'holiness-through-works [from] holiness by grace,' is 'alien' to
Judaism.").
31. For a wonderful discussion on this topic, see Resnicoff, supra note 16.
32. See Pearce, supra note 1, at 1261-62. As Pearce points out, l[eixtensive hiring
discrimination against Jewish lawyers was documented as late as the 1960s and
stereotypes of Jewish lawyers, both positive and negative, persist today." Id. at
1262 (citation omitted).
33. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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out of your mouth? We tend to self-order affiliations in terms of their
importance. Listen to how people describe themselves: "soccer mom";
"liberal Democrat."34 Obviously, the self-ordering is context-depen-
dent. But if you look at self-ordering over a wide variety of contexts,
some patterns are going to emerge. Listen to the ways in which a law-
yer might identify herself. What comes first in the description? Do
you hear "lawyer"? "Litigator"? "Inside counsel"? "Public interest
lawyer"? "African-American lawyer"? Another combination of per-
sonal and professional identity?35 What I've been listening for re-
cently is how many lawyers identify themselves first as Jewish
lawyers. Not only have I been listening for that, but I'm really inter-
ested in defining what that means.
For those unaffiliated Jews who really don't add their religious af-
filiation to their core self-identity, there shouldn't be much difficulty in
trying to deal with issues where Jewish ethics and legal ethics may
conflict. The question doesn't come up because the twin affiliations
aren't, in the person's own mind, equally strong.3 6 Sandy Levinson
refers to this as the "bleaching out" of lawyers: washing away individ-
ual lawyers' other affinities as we educate them to be lawyers, so that
their "lawyerness" overwhelms any of their other characteristics. 3 7
Much has been written on the socialization of law students into
lawyers, starting from the premise that law schools train law students
to "think like lawyers,"38 and then questioning whether that presump-
tion, in fact, holds true.39 Several studies have confirmed that law
34. Of course, the complicating factor is that we also self-order in terms of context.
In a group of law professors, I won't say rm a law professor. rl say that I teach
bankruptcy, or that I'm also a Dean, or something else that has resonance to the
group as a whole (since "law professor" is, in that context, a "given").
35. rve never heard people identify themselves as "white male lawyers." Either it
doesn't happen, because the dominant paradigm of lawyering is still "white
male," or it doesn't happen in my presence. (Of course, I don't go around identify-
ing myself as a "woman lawyer," both because I hate that phrase and because one
look at me is a dead giveaway.) People identify themselves in a way to give con-
text and to distinguish themselves from the others in the group.
36. Russell Pearce suggests that identified but nonreligious Jews would use their
background to fight for justice and fairness. See Pearce, supra note 1, at 1263-64.
37. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 1578. Monroe Freedman has called into question
Levinson's use of the phrase "bleaching out." See Freedman, supra note 8, at
1134 (I was taken aback when I learned that I am being used, or misused, by
Professor Sanford Levinson as representing those lawyers whose religious iden-
tity and personal ethics have been 'bleached out' by their professional ethics.").
38. See JOHN JAY OSBORNE, JR., THE PAPER CHASE (1971); THE PAPER CHASE (Twenti-
eth Century-Fox 1973).
39. See, e.g., Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself A Review of Empirical Research
on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1337 (1997);
Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy
League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1994); Cheryl M. Herden, Women in
Legal Education: A Feminist Analysis of Law School, 63 REv. JuR. U.P.R. 551
(1994); Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76
[Vol. 78:18
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students evolve during law school to focus more on unemotional legal
reasoning (what some call a "rights" focus) and less on questions of
community-centered caring (what some call the "ethics of care"). 40
Other studies indicate that law students enter law school with partic-
ular "lawyer attributes"4 1-in other words, that some self-selection
goes on in the law school application process. 42
But what I'm particularly concerned about is what other attributes
in addition to gender and race-in particular, the ethical attributes-
law students bring into, and take out of, law school. The literature
talks about the socialization into law school of women and people of
color.43 I haven't seen much written on the socialization into law
school of observant Jews or Christians or Moslems or secular human-
MINN. L. REv. 193 (1991); Brian Owsley, Black Ivy: An African-American Per-
spective on Law School, 28 COLm. Huiu. RTs. L. REv. 501 (1997); E. Michelle
Rabouin, Walking the Talk: Transforming Law Students Into Ethical Transac-
tional Lawyers, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1 (1996); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Ques-
tions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. Rzv. 1547 (1993);
Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations
About Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DU=s J. GENDER L. &
PoL'Y 119 (1997); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of
Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1299 (1988).
40. See Janoff, supra note 39, at 217-233 (finding that, at the beginning of law school,
female law students were more likely to use an ethics of care approach and male
law students were more likely to use a rights approach; over the first year, female
students shift away from the ethics of care and toward a rights approach, while
male students maintain their orientation toward the rights approach; and at the
end of the first year, law students generally orient more toward the rights ap-
proach); Sturm, supra note 39, at 128 ("Legal education plays a pivotal role in
socializing lawyers to the primacy of the gladiator model."); cf Rhode, supra note
39, at 1554 ("We can avoid sweeping claims about woman's essential nature while
noting that particular groups of women under particular social conditions come
to law with expectations and experiences different from those of men.") (emphasis
added).
41. See Daicoff, supra note 39, at 1403-20. Daicoffreports that:
Law students come to law school with a set of preexisting personality
traits. For example, they may be more interested in school than others
and tend to emphasize active behavior, initiating action affecting their
environment rather than being passive or reactive. They may have bet-
ter leadership and social skills than others, even as elementary school
children, but be less interested in emotional concerns and the feelings of
others. Pre-law students appear to have greater needs for assuming
roles of leadership and dominance and for securing attention, and ap-
pear to be less subordinate or deferential than other pre-professional
students.
Id. at 1403-04.
42. Obviously, the socialization process isn't total, especially when legal ethics are
concerned. Legal education doesn't create waves of lawyer clones, each seeing the
world through identical lenses. Reasonable people can disagree about what they
can and can't do under the ethics rules.
43. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also Margaret M. Russell, Beyond
"Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of Legal Prac-
tice, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 766 (1997).
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ists. Moreover, I wonder how people who enter law school with deeply
ingrained ethical beliefs handle the particular issues faced by lawyers.
Overall, do I think that some bleaching out occurs? Maybe.44 But I
also think that it's easier to bleach out things that aren't so deeply
woven into the entire fabric. The problem is that strong ethical beliefs
can conflict with legal ethics to the point of making the conflicted law-
yer choose between her identity as a lawyer and her identity as a
member of a group holding particular ethical beliefs.
Let's assume that we don't want "bleaching out" as much as we
want some sort of "interweaving."4 5 Then if we progress along the
continuum from "unaffiliated" to "ethnic but not religious" to "reli-
gious," 4 6 we see the problem: those Jews who are more affiliated
might well have a problem when Jewish ethics conflict with legal
ethics.4 7
I've spoken in generalities up to this point, and now it's time to give
my generalizations some context. One way to do this is to examine
some identifying characteristics of lawyers as professionals: there's
loyalty (including zealous representation of the client), confidentiality,
the dual (and sometimes dueling) roles of the lawyer as advocate for
(or counselor to) the client and as officer of the court,4 8 and the notion
that the lawyer, as a professional, owes a duty of service to the com-
44. But see, e.g., Guinier, supra note 39 (arguing that attitudinal differences between
women and men are homogenized by the conclusion of law school); ef Rhode,
supra note 39, at 1554 ("Legal practice responds to a complex interplay of forces;
law school socialization is only one, and in many arenas, hardly the most
influential.").
Not everything is, or should be, "bleachable." As Pearce suggests, "[i]nstead of
trying to 'bleach out' difference, we should try to 'create community' by speaking
frankly about how to realize a legal system which results in equal justice given
our differences and our similarities." Pearce, supra note 1, at 1269-70.
45. See Rabouin, supra note 39, at 15 ("In order to do an adequate job of ethical edu-
cation.., one has to combine the insights of Kohlberg [and his stratified ladder of
ethical reasoning] and Gilligan [and her observations about gender differences in
ethical reasoning]. An integrative approach incorporates thinking, action, and
moral affect that often serves as a motivational bridge between knowing what is
right and actually doing it.").
46. rm oversimplifying here. There's also "ethnic and religious," at least, and proba-
bly there are other categories as well. But we'll stick to oversimplifying for now.
47. As Steve Resnicoff explains,
[A]s a practical matter, Jewish lawyers exist in a secular environment
which, because of its emphasis on the attorney-client relationship and
the adversary process, exhorts attorneys to represent clients irrespective
of the moral repugnance of their causes and trains them to employ tech-
niques that, at least in individual cases, are not designed to reach a just
result - or a result that complies with Jewish law. This ambience oper-
ates to deaden a Jewish lawyer's sensitivity to Jewish lawrs] obligations
and aspirations.
Resnicoff, supra note 16, at 103.
48. Traditionally, Jewish doctrine has been uncomfortable with the idea of advocacy.
Maimonides feared that lawyers would manipulate facts so as to obscure the let-
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munity. These characteristics have both client-based and community-
based qualities. They're client-based in the sense that most of the du-
ties relate to the trust that the client places in the lawyer. The lawyer
is supposed to honor the client's needs to the exclusion of the needs of
non-clients. However, there's still that troubling issue of balancing
the needs of the client with the needs of the legal system as a whole-
the "officer of the court" problem.
Now let's look at some identifying characteristics of Jews. This
one's more difficult because it depends on where along the continuum
we look. At some points along the continuum, there are, for example,
the obligation to fulfill the commandments (halacha and how far to
take that) and the obligation of tikkun olam (repairing the world).
Unlike the obligations of lawyers as professionals, which are both
community-centered and client-centered, these Jewish obligations
seem much more community-focused, even though the obligations are
individual in nature. In other words, Jews are supposed to help make
the world better through their individual actions.
In certain areas, legal obligations and Jewish obligations mesh or
at least overlap. Examples range from a zero tolerance of scriveners'
errors (in order to maintain honesty in dealing with opposing parties),
to making society accountable for-and accessible to-the underprivi-
leged,4 9 to upholding education as an affirmative good.50
Nonetheless, there are conflicts, and those conflicts are serious.
The most widely discussed conflict is between the lawyer's duty of con-
fidentiality and the Jew's obligation to the community or to basic
moral precepts. 5 1 Here, we see two competing lines of authority,
ter of the law. See Pearce, supra note 1, at 1264-65; Levinson, supra note 14, at
1598-99.
49. See Pearce, supra note 1, at 1268-69 ("[The conduct of the Jewish lawyer-in up-
holding the rule of law and in serving the poor could be quite consistent with
professional ideals. What differentiates this perspective from the simple equa-
tion of Jewish and professional values is that its foundation is Jewish values[,]
which may overlap with professional values, but will not necessarily do so.") (em-
phasis added) (footnote omitted).
50. Another similarity, at least when we're talking about observant or semi-obser-
vant Jews, is that they voluntarily abide by a code of conduct that differs from
that of the general population, as do practicing lawyers.
51. See Pearce, supra note 1, at 1268-69 (discussing the conflict between legal obliga-
tions of confidentiality and Jewish obligations to the community as a whole). In-
terpretations of Leviticus 19:16 ("You shall not stand idly by the blood of your
neighbor") suggest that it mandates disclosure of information in order to protect
lives, prevent injury, or prevent financial loss. See also Leslie Griffin, The Law-
yer's Dirty Hands, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 219, 275-76 (1995) (referring to the
paradigmatic question about whether a lawyer who knows where her client has
buried the bodies of children whom the client has murdered may ever reveal the
location of the bodies, and concluding that Judaism rejects the idea that a secular
code can eclipse the interests of the community-instead, Judaism's rules about
confidentiality and community, not secular rules, must be determinative); Arthur
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which are given much different weights in Jewish ethics and legal eth-
ics. One line of authority is based on the sanctity of life;52 the other is
based on the need to honor confidences. 53 In Judaism, the sanctity of
life will trump the obligation of confidentiality.5 4 In legal ethics, confi-
dentiality will often trump the sanctity of life.
If it's true that, in Judaism, saving a life will trump the obligation
of confidentiality,5 5 then what is a Jewish lawyer to do when the law-
yer's obligation of confidentiality conflicts with the Jew's obligation to
protect a life?
Let's start with a version of a legal ethics rule governing confiden-
tiality: Model Rule 1.6. It provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as
stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer be-
lieves is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
Gross Schaefer & Peter S. Levi, Resolving the Conflict Between the Ethical Values
of Confidentiality and Saving a Life: A Jewish View, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1761,
1761 (1996) ("The Jewish ethical tradition occupies a different vantage point
based upon a clear principle that spiritual values will trump socially based
rules.").
52. See Schaefer & Levi, supra note 51, at 1763-64.
53. See id. at 1764-65 (noting the prohibitions against revealing a confidence without
permission and against tale-bearing).
54. As Schaefer and Levi have stated:
Strangely enough, the two values in question [saving a life and confi-
dentiality] . .. are alluded to in the same verse of Scripture, Leviticus
19:16: "Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy peo-
ple; neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbor: I am the
Lord." The juxtaposition of the two parts of this verse is not an accident.
The latter half is brought to bear on the former. The first part of the
verse provides that privacy and confidential information cannot gener-
ally be divulged. This prohibition is limited and modified by the latter
phrase[,] which is traditionally interpreted that one should do every-
thing possible to protect life and property from loss and injury, directly
or indirectly, including [by] providing information.... Hence, saving a
life takes precedence over preserving a confidential communication. The
absolute spiritual value of life ranks higher in the hierarchy, thus pre-
cluding any possible need for a calculation weighing disparate values.
Id. at 1766-67. The exceptions to the rule that saving a life trumps all other
duties are (1) avoiding idolatry, (2) avoiding adultery, (3) avoiding incest, and (4)
avoiding premeditated murder. See id. at 1763-64.
55. But see supra note 54 (exceptions to that rule).
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involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the law-
yer's representation of the client.
5 6
Note several important aspects of Rule 1.6.57 First, a lawyer is not
permitted to reveal a confidence based on a confession of a past trans-
gression. The rule permits the lawyer to disclose a confidence only "to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act"-present tense-
"that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or sub-
stantial bodily harm." Second, the rule permits-but does not re-
quire-the lawyer to reveal a confidence under these limited
circumstances (imminent death or substantial bodily harm). A lawyer
could get along perfectly well her entire career without revealing any
unconsented confidences at all, even ones involving imminent harm by
her client.
Jews, though, are commanded to revere life. This is where the di-
lemma traditionally is joined. The best description of this dilemma is
one written by Russell Pearce.5 8 Pearce posits the following situa-
tion. A rabbi, who's also a lawyer, hears a congregant's confession.
56. The counterpart to the more modern Model Rule 1.6 is Model Code DR 4-101,
which provides:
(A) "Confidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law, and 'secret" refers to other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
be likely to be detrimental to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101 (C), a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the
client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of him-
self or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients af-
fected, but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules
or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or
to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of
wrongful conduct.
(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees,
associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from disclosing
or using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may re-
veal the information allowed by DR 4-101 (C) through an employee.
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 4-101.
57. Because Model Rule 1.6 is just that - a model rule that serves as a jazz riff for
particular state-adopted versions of confidentiality rules - there are significant
variations among the states regarding what confidential information a lawyer
may reveal.
58. Russell G. Pearce, To Save a Life: Why a Rabbi and a Jewish Lawyer Must Dis-
close a Client Confidence, 29 Loy. L-.A. L. REV. 1771 (1996).
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The congregant killed a police officer but was never caught; instead,
an innocent person was scheduled to be executed for the crime.5 9 May
the rabbi inform the authorities that she has information exonerating
the condemned man? Must she?
Pearce walks us through the reasons favoring confidentiality, both
in terms of Jewish ethics and legal ethics. First, Jewish law values
confidentiality highly, and the congregant certainly wasn't about to
give his permission for the rabbi to waive that confidentiality.60 In
addition, the principle that "the law of the land is the law," insofar as
the "law of the land" doesn't conflict with fundamental Jewish con-
cepts, would cut in favor of protecting confidentiality (as long as the
confidential information wasn't needed to save a life).61 After all, the
rabbi-turned-lawyer is also a lawyer,62 and the confidentiality rules
wouldn't give her carte blanche to disclose under this circumstance.
(The congregant isn't threatening to go out and commit a crime; he's
confessing about a crime already committed.)6 3 Finally, confidential-
ity is typically justified on the grounds that it's better to create a "safe
haven" for the client, so that the lawyer has the benefit of knowing all
of the facts, than it is to expose client confidences to disclosure.64
Pearce concludes, though, that the rabbi-turned-lawyer should dis-
close this information.65 An innocent person is about to be executed,
and the congregant's interest in confidentiality is outweighed by the
need to save the innocent person's life.66 If there were a way to save
the life without the disclosure, then the rabbi-turned-lawyer must try
to reconcile confidentiality with the obligation to preserve life. Here,
though, there's no other way than through disclosure. 6 7 Pearce's ver-
sion of this allegory is far more lyric than my recapping of it. Unlike
Sandy Levinson's attempts to sidestep the issue in his article discuss-
ing this age-old problem,6 8 Pearce meets the problem head-on. He
concludes that the rabbi's Jewishness must trump her lawyerness and
that she must reveal the congregant's confidences. Pearce doesn't
59. See id. at 1771-72.
60. See id. at 1773.
61. See id. at 1773-74.
62. See id. at 1774.
63. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 2, Rule 1.6; MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 4-101.
64. See Pearce, supra note 58, at 1771-72.
65. Pearce's conclusion is, of course, not the only possible one under Jewish law. Be-
cause there are as many possible conclusions about what Jewish lawyers should
do in this type of situation as there are Jews who spend time thinking about the
situation itself, the answers will vary enormously. From my point of view,
though, it is important for a lawyer to spend time thinking about where her
moral code would take her if she is ever faced with such a situation, even if her
ultimate conclusion is difficult (or impossible) to reach.
66. See id. at 1776.
67. See id. at 1776-79.
68. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 1610-11.
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spell out the consequence of such a decision, but the consequence is
nonetheless clear: the rabbi will, in all likelihood, be giving up her
license to practice law.6 9
Whew! That's heady stuff. An observant Jew may well not be able
to continue being a practicing lawyer, at least under difficult circum-
stances such as these.70 An unaffiiated Jew, on the other hand,
wouldn't face the same struggle.
What about the ethnically identified but nonobservant Jew? This
poses a much tougher case. Observant-and even semi-observant or
erratically observant-Jews are able to point to other (Jewish) rules
that conflict with the rules of legal ethics. I'm not sure what ethni-
cally identified Jews would point to: perhaps historical tradition or
social policy. But will historical tradition or social policy trump actual
legal ethics? I just don't know, and I'll have to leave the resolution of
this to another time. It all comes down to this: it's crucial to be aware
of what parts of your identity are dictating your life choices - and ca-
reer choices are life choices.
One important point to remember is that the affiliation applies just
as well in terms of other group membership: the stronger the affilia-
tion to the other group, and the more different that group's ethical
rules are from legal ethics, the more tension there will be between
that group's ethics and legal ethics. Even if we venture away from
religious ethics to cultural ethics, we see the same result.7 1
69. Freedman has proposed a confidentiality rule that would reconcile these conflict-
ing principles. See Freedman, supra note 8, at 1136-17. He sums it up nicely:
Because of the strong influence of Jewish tradition on fundamental
American rights, this means that ethical rules should reflect Jewish
moral ideals. These ideals include the sanctity and the dignity of the
individual, compassion for fellow human beings, individual autonomy,
equal protection of the laws, and zealous representation. I believe,
therefore, that my professional life and my faith are consistent with each
other. It is difficult to see how it could be otherwise.
Id. at 1138. I admire Freedman's views, although I don't accept them whole-
heartedly. I believe that, in certain types of law practices, it's very difficult to
combine - let alone balance - Jewish and legal ethics rules.
70. Of course, that's also true for observant Jews who have to decide what career
paths other than law are open to them, given their desire to remain observant.
(Thanks to Art Greenbaum for pointing this out in an earlier draft.)
71. As Peggy Russell explains,
[Wihen issues of race are at least arguably relevant factors in a case,
Black attorneys face an unduly restrictive set of choices, each of which
carries impossible burdens. Saddled with the tacit professional expecta-
tion of being responsible for identifying, fixing, or rationalizing away
race problems outside the courtroom, Black attorneys who raise such
concerns in court often face a heavy burden ofjustifying either that race
really exists as an issue at all, or that they are competent to address the
topic of race in a fair and reasoned manner. When Black attorneys artic-
ulate racism as a primary factor in a particular case, they may encounter
fractious demands that they "prove it," or harsh accusations that they
are "playing the race card" or otherwise engaging in unprofessional be-
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So where do we go from here? I believe that it comes down to
knowing who you are and what you believe. This reminds me of a
scene from one of my favorite movies, Dead Again.7 2 In that movie,
Robin Williams, playing a therapist, is talking to Kenneth Branagh,
who plays a detective. During their conversation, it's clear that
Branagh desperately wants to smoke, but he's trying just as desper-
ately not to. Williams, in exasperation, tells Branagh73 to decide what
he is-a smoker or a non-smoker-and then just be it. That's my ad-
vice, too. 7 4
Where I come down on the self-identification line is that, if an affil-
iation forms any part of someone's self-identification, then it's danger-
ous to try to compartmentalize away that affiliation. If I do think of
myself as a Jewish, female lawyer, then I can't put on just my Jewish
hat, or just my female hat, or just my lawyer hat. Without getting too
Freudian here, I can't suppress one part of my essential self at the
expense of another part unless I want to get my whole psychological
system out of whack.75
havior. Conversely, when Black attorneys take on advocacy obligations
that require the subordination and decontextualization of issues of race
in the service of other objectives, they may be labeled as "sellouts" who
have abandoned their communities. Whatever the choice, the focus of
such cases inevitably becomes not just race, but their race and their
lawyerly merits as well. Unlike white attorneys, who have the relatively
luxurious comfort of invisibility and transparency in raising issues of
race in the lawyering process, Black attorneys must always brace them-
selves to have their racial, professional, and personal identities placed in
issue as well. This additional layer of scrutiny and suspicion may in
turn raise for the Black attorney difficult professional and personal ques-
tions of identity, autonomy, authenticity, and loyalty. Unless, as sug-
gested above, Black attorneys steel themselves mentally and
emotionally for the extra demands of race work in a legal system that
still operates on the unspoken assumption that fixing race problems is
naturally the work of minorities, they are destined to lead professional
lives of fatigue, frustration, and perhaps exploitation. This in turn sig-
nificantly undermines the social-justice imperatives that lead public-
spirited Blacks - whether in the private or public sectors - to select
law as a career path in the first place.
Russell, supra note 43, at 771-72 (footnotes omitted); see also Bill Ong Hing, Rais-
ing Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orien-
tation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807
(1993); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a
Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030 (1995);
David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in
Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1981 (1993).
72. DEAD AGAnv (Paramount 1991).
73. And Im paraphrasing.
74. Not about smoking, but about knowing yourself.
75. Actually, I think that compartmentalization forms a large part of lawyer dissatis-
faction. Lawyers (especially beginning lawyers) mistakenly separate their hu-
manness from their "lawyerness." That cognitive dissonance ("I have to do this as
a lawyer, even though it makes me sick to my stomach.") leads to professional
dissatisfaction, if not downright misery. For some more interesting reading on
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That means that, to the extent that I am more aligned with obser-
vant Jews than with unaffiliated Jews, I have to be careful about what
types of law I practice in order to avoid forcing myself into an inherent
contradiction between my two spheres of rules.76 Being a criminal de-
fense lawyer might cause problems because of the confidentiality is-
sue. Being a transactional lawyer in a large and high-powered law
firm may cause problems because of the prohibitions about working on
Shabbat. If the pull of this particular affiliation is strong enough,
then I can't categorize it away in a neat little box.77 The stronger the
affiliation, the more it should be honored. In particular, the more
strongly someone feels about his belief system, the more that belief
system should be shaping his other choices.
Now, let's get personal. What does being a Jewish lawyer mean for
me? The "top-down-ness" of being Jewish is important enough for me
that I don't want to force a showdown with the "bottom-up" world of
legal ethics. I love being a lawyer. I love being Jewish. I don't want
to put myself into a position of having to choose. In a tie, though, I
know what I'd do.
this subject, see Judith L. Maute, Balanced Lives in a Stressful Profession: An
Impossible Dream?, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 797 (1992).
76. As Steve Resnicoff explains,
Halakha does not explicitly bar Jews from becoming secular lawyers.
Indeed, lawyers can importantly promote Jewish interests. For exam-
ple, they can defend individuals from physical, financial, or psychological
oppression, they can protect children in family disputes, and they can
advance communal interests by representing organizations committed to
Jewish priorities.
Nonetheless, various Jewish law values powerfully militate against
the acceptance of certain matters or the use of specific strategies or con-
ventions. Among other things, Jewish law opposes actions that unfairly
harm third parties, that cast the Jewish faith in a falsely unflattering
light, or that, because of the actions' spiritually corrosive character, eat
away at the intrinsic holiness of the Jewish actor and, indirectly, of the
entire Jewish people.
Resnicoff, supra note 16, at 74 (footnote omitted).
77. Cf Daicoff, supra note 39, at 1402 n.404; Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring:
Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
1175, 1180 n.25 (1992) ("This retreat to the personal realm to express one's caring
self was frequently identified in practicing lawyers by Dana and Rand Jack in
their studies of women attorneys. According to the studies, women lawyers ex-
perienced this strategy as requiring a difficult and sometimes painful splitting of
the self.") (citing Dana Jack & Rand Jack, Women Lawyers: Archetype and Alter-
natives, in MAPPING THE MoRAL DorAm 263, 277-81 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds.,
1988)); Rand Jack & Dana Crowley Jack, Women Lawyers: Archetype and Alter-
natives, 57 FoRDHAi L. REv. 933 (1989); Janoff, supra note 39, at 229-30 (noting
that the data in her study supported the Jack & Jack hypothesis that "a majority
of their [Jack & Jack's] subjects isolated their personal characteristics that were
incompatible with the role of a lawyer and guarded against the resulting emo-
tional struggle in one of two ways... [by] den[ying] the conflict... [or] split[ting]
their orientations so that their affectionate sides stayed at home and their stoic,
detached sides came to the office.") (footnotes omitted).
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How do I avoid having to choose between my two worlds? For one
thing, I can say "no" to representations that I can't stomach 7 -a lux-
ury that, as a law professor, I can certainly afford. But I want to go
beyond avoiding the conflict. I actually want to interweave both
worlds, and I can do that. For one thing, as a lawyer and as a Jew, I
can recognize that I'm an example in the community (both when I'm
actually lawyering and when I'm doing non-lawyering things, like
shopping for groceries), and I can behave accordingly. As a lawyer
and as a Jew, I can treat people with kindness and with respect. I can
enjoy both traditions' enthusiasm for debate and interpretation-even
when it comes to the hardest question of all: who am I?
78. Note: that may mean saying "yes" to clients I don't particularly like if the point of
the representation itself is important to me. My apocryphal story is foreclosing
on a halfway house of a church in December: yes, I went to court to throw out the
management; no, I didn't throw out the residents. The reason that I could go into
court (with, mind you, the observation rows ifiled with parishioners) and do that
was that I believed that throwing out the management (who had allegedly "lost"
approximately $500,000 of the halfway house's fimds) was better for the resi-
dents. I slept well that night.
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